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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the possible labour market and fiscal impacts of labour tax 
reductions in a typically Belgian setting, i.e. a wage norm regime with automatic price 
indexing of wages.  We consider reductions in employers' social security contributions and 
fiscal compensation through value added or production taxes. 
 
Reductions in employers' social security contributions can only have significant 
employment effects if they effectively reduce labour costs.  These reductions are only  
partly self-financing, and the cost per job created is high.  The remaining negative impact 
on the government budget should be compensated through an alternative means of 
financing  this expenditure, since not–compensating for the budgetary loss is not a realistic 
option in the long run.  For this purpose, various financing schemes can be envisaged, but 
an increase in value added tax and the introduction of a tax on production (mimicking 
environmental taxes affecting firms' production costs) are the two possibilities considered 
in this paper. The alternative financing mechanisms destroy some of the positive 
employment effects of the initial reductions.  However, on balance the combined measures 
can create some employment without worsening the  government budget balance.   The 
reaction of wages to the reduction in employers' social security contributions and to the 
fiscal compensation measures proves crucial. The more the initial reductions in employers' 
contributions are used to finance higher gross wages, and the more the inflationary effects 
of fiscal compensation measures are passed on in wages, the less positive the impact on 
employment will be.  This means that little job creation is to be expected without a special 
co-ordination effort between all labour market players.  Labour tax reductions are by no 
means a substitute for other labour market reforms. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper analyses labour market and fiscal impacts of labour tax reductions in the 
Belgian setting of a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing of wages.  We try to 
provide an answer to the question: how do budget-neutral reductions in employers' social 
security contributions (ESSC) affect job creation in Belgium?  The tool we use for analysis 
is a macroeconomic model of the Belgian economy, featuring the main institutional 
characteristics of the labour market. 
 
The choice of such a macroeconomic model as our tool implies that we only analyse 
aggregate effects on 'average' employees.  This macroeconomic approach does not allow 
us to distinguish between the microeconomic effects of specific reductions for certain 
target groups of workers, e.g. focused reductions for low-wage earners, the young 
unemployed or the long-term unemployed.  The choice of a macroeconomic model also 
limits the choice of alternative financing mechanisms.  As an example, it is not possible to 
investigate the economic and environmental effects of very specific 'green' taxes (CO2-tax, 
energy tax, …), nor the different effects of a wealth tax.  Another drawback of the 
macroeconomic modelling approach is that nothing can be said about welfare or income 
distribution effects.  We can only analyse general effects on total employment creation, 
average wages and labour costs, and the government's total budget account.  We cannot 
say what kinds of jobs will be created (or destroyed), and who's income will relatively 
increase or decline. 
 
Regarding the simulations of ESSC reductions, budget neutrality is obtained through a 
shift from direct taxation, i.e. the ESSC, to indirect taxation, i.e. value added tax (VAT) and 
a tax on production (PT) that acts as a rough proxy for environmental taxes affecting firms' 
production costs. We distinguish the channels through which employers' social security 
contributions and indirect taxes have an impact on the economy, and try to simulate the 
effect of the alternative tax shifts on employment and on the government budget. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, we give a short overview 
of the relevant international and Belgian literature, and indicate similarities and differences 
in relation to our own work. Section 3 describes the main i nstitutional features of wage 
formation in Belgium. Section 4 presents the main building blocks of the model we use. 
Section 5 explains how simulations are run and section 6 shows the results.  Section 7 
ends with the main conclusions and policy implications that can be drawn from the 
analysis. 2  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The literature, empirical as well as theoretical, on the impact of labour taxes on both 
employment and on the government budget is very extensive.  In this section we only give 
a brief overview of the main findings, with a special interest for studies pertaining to the 
situation in Belgium.  We also place this paper in the context of the existing literature and 
indicate similarities and differences between our work and the work of others. 
 
2.1  Employment effects of labour tax reductions 
 
Net tax pressure on labour as a production factor (employers' contributions to social 
security and other possible employment taxes or subsidies), as well as taxes on labour as 
a source of income (employees' contributions to social security, income taxation and 
possible exemptions and subsidies), has in nearly all theoretical analyses a negative 
impact on employment (growth) and on labour market participation.  This holds for both 
mainstreams in theoretical  labour economics: the (new) classical school assuming 
perfectly competitive and clearing labour and product markets, and the (new) Keynesian 
approach that leaves the hypothesis of clearing markets behind and takes into account 
institutional corrections of market mechanisms
1. 
 
In (new) classical models of the labour market, wage rate and employment level are 
determined through the interaction of labour demand (by the employers) and labour supply 
(by the employees) on a perfectly competitive labour market.  I n such models, employers' 
labour taxes and contributions cause labour demand to fall for a given gross wage rate, 
resulting in a new equilibrium with less employment.  Employees' taxes and contributions 
cause labour supply to fall for a given gross wage
2, also resulting in an equilibrium with 
less employment. 
 
In (new) Keynesian models of the labour market, the sharing of firms' value added 
between employers and employees, and the competing claims made by both parties on 
this value added through their price-setting behaviour and labour demand and through 
their wage demands, determine the wage rate and the employment level.  Employers' 
 
                                                                 
1  A treatment of both schools of theoretical models is, of course, to be found in any labour economics manual. For a 
comparison of the impact of labour taxation in both models, see e.g. Van Poeck e.o. (1998). 
2  This is the case if contributions are not regarded as postponed income or as an expected return from some kind of 
insurance. WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  3 
taxes and contributions make firms less willing to hire personnel for a given gross wage, 
leading to an equilibrium with less employment. Employees' taxes and contributions 
increase workers' gross wage demands in order to preserve their purchasing power. 
These higher wage claims result in an equilibrium with less employment. 
 
Given the negative impact of labour tax pressure on the labour market, a reduction in 
labour taxes or social security contributions would, according to these models, contribute 
to employment growth.  Empirical research, at both international and  Belgian level, 
confirms these theoretical propositions
3.  The Belgian Federal Planning Bureau
4, in 
particular, has done work in this area using its HERMES model, including several studies 
that try to estimate the employment impact of actual labour tax reductions in Belgium over 
the past years.  This paper largely confirms the qualitative results of these studies. 
 
2.2  The importance of wage formation 
 
The impact of labour tax pressure on employment is determined by the extent to which this 
pressure weighs on the labour cost for the employer.  In a (new) classical model, this 
extent depends largely on the respective wage elasticities of labour demand and labour 
supply; in a (new) Keynesian model, it largely depends on partly institutionally determined 
factors, such as the relative bargaining power of employers and employees, the influence 
of outsiders on wage negotiations and the degree of co-ordination of the wage formation 
process.  In the end, both models boil down to the same thing.  As an example, a reduction 
in employers' taxes or social security contributions is more likely to give way to higher 
gross wages and thus to less employment creation in a rigid economy or in a period of 
rapid economic growth and a tight labour market, characterised by a hard to expand and 
thus inelastic labour supply (in the classical reasoning) and a relatively strong bargaining 
position for employees (in the Keynesian way of thinking), unless sufficient co-ordination 
between government and social partners can lead to another outcome. 
 
When taxes are not passed on in higher labour costs and thus are borne entirely by 
employees, in the form of a lower net wage, they have little or no direct negative impact on 
employment.  If labour costs remain constant, the relative cost of labour compared to  
                                                                 
3  See e.g.: Assouline e.o. (1997), Audric e.o. (2000), Bossier e.o. (1987, 1996), Daveri e.o. (2000), De Bruyne e.o. (1998), 
Dewatripont (1991), Elmeskov e.o. (1998), Ginsburgh e.o. (1990), Layard e.o. (1991), Omey e.o. (1998), Pearson e.o. 
(2000), Tullio (1987), Tyrväinen (1995), Vanderlinden (1991), Van Poeck e.o. (1998). 
4  See e.g.: Bossier e.o. (1987,  1995, 1996) and Stockman (2001). 4  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
capital and the initial international competitive position are unchanged. This prevents firms' 
labour demand from falling. In general, the negative impact of labour taxes on employment 
is bigger the more these taxes are shifted into higher labour costs for employers and the 
less they are borne by employees' take-home pay.  These findings are confirmed by many 
international and Belgian studies
5. 
 
In the same line of reasoning, the extent to which wage labour tax reductions stimulate 
employment depends in theory on the reaction of wages to this tax reduction.  If the tax 
reduction has its full impact on total labour costs, it delays the substitution of capital for 
labour and it can improve the international competitive position, depending on what 
happens with wages in competing countries.  A tax reduction that merely gives way to 
higher gross wages misses out on these two effects and can only create some extra 
employment through the increase in domestic demand, stemming from a rise in household 
disposable income induced by the wage increase. 
 
This finding is confirmed for Belgium by recent empirical research by the Federal Planning 
Bureau
6.  Since institutional settings in Belgium, most importantly the interaction between 
the wage norm and the automatic indexing mechanism, largely determine the reaction of 
wages to labour tax reductions, this will be a crucial part of the analysis in this paper. 
 
2.3  Specific labour tax reductions aimed at low-wage earners 
 
The tax wedge between total labour costs and net wages has an especially negative 
impact on job creation at the lower end of the labour market comprising less productive 
and lower-paid labour.  In as much as tax pressure on that kind of labour weighs on labour 
costs, it makes it too expensive to employ such labour in production.  As a consequence, 
this less productive labour is expelled from the production process. In as much as the tax 
pressure reduces the net income from labour, it increases the probability of financial 
unemployment traps for certain groups of people, which will decrease their labour supply. 
Therefore, specific tax reductions geared towards the low-paid are often regarded as very 
effective for the creation of jobs for people with a low educational attainment level or for 
the creation of less productive jobs in general
7. 
 
                                                                 
5   See e.g. Bossier e.o. (1987, 1996), De Bruyne e.o. (1998), Elmeskov e.o. (1998), Knoester e.o. (1987), Leibfritz (1997), 
Pearson e.o. (2000), Pissarides (1998), Scarpetta (1996), Summers e.o. (1993), Tyrväinen (1995), OECD (1994, 1997b), 
Van Poeck e.o. (1998). 
6   See Stockman (2001). 
7   See e.g. OECD (1994, 1999b, 1999c, 2001), and Snower (1995). WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  5 
In spite of the fact that such specific measures not only promote job creation for certain 
problem groups, but sometimes also slow down job creation for others (a crowding-out 
effect), in international and Belgian research they often appear to perform better than 
generalised linear measures.  Where the labour market is characterised by relatively high 
unemployment rates among such target groups, specific policy measures can be 
effective
8. 
 
For recent results of research on Belgium, we refer to studies by the Federal Planning 
Bureau
9. The Bank's macroeconomic model used in this paper cannot distinguish between 
differentiated tax reductions for specific target groups.  Therefore, this aspect is not treated 
in this paper. 
 
2.4  Compensating fiscal measures and alternative financing of social security 
 
The tax reduction's direct fiscal cost for the government budget consists of the actual 
rebates paid to employers or employees, or the decrease in the tax rates multiplied by the 
taxable base, i.e. the gross wage bill.  However, this direct cost does not equal the ex post 
net fiscal cost for the government.  The eventual fiscal cost of the policy measures differs 
from the direct or initial cost to the extent that the taxable base itself changes as a 
consequence of these measures.  Tax reductions lead to changes in the gross wage bill 
because they cause changes in wages and/or employment. 
 
In this way, a labour tax reduction partially finances itself through feedback effects: it leads 
to an increase in employment and/or wages and thereby a rise in the taxable base.  These 
feedback effects, however, almost never fully compensate for the initial revenue loss. In 
part, this is due to the fact that the wage elasticity of labour demand (in absolute value) is 
less than one, which is confirmed by almost any macroeconometric study on that subject. 
This implies that a labour cost reduction does indeed lead to an increase in employment, 
but also that the employment increase is proportionally smaller than the labour cost 
reduction that caused it.  The exact magnitude of the feedback effects is a purely empirical 
question that can only be answered by econometric research specific to each measure. 
 
If the government decides to keep its expenditure (e.g. for social security benefits) at the 
same level as before, the initial revenue loss of tax reductions must be compensated for by 
                                                                 
8   For research on this topic, see e.g.: Assouline e.o. (1997), Audric (2000), Bossier e.o. (1995), De Lathouwer e.o. (2001), 
Fitoussi (2000), L'Horty (2000), Phelps (2000), Vanderlinden (1991). 
9   See e.g.: Bossier (1996). 6  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
other revenues. Indeed, like all taxes, labour taxes are meant to finance government 
expenditure.  Such alternative government revenues (for social security) are often sought, 
both in the literature and in practice, in different forms of indirect taxation, such as value 
added taxes or other taxes related to production (e.g. energy taxes or CO2-levies). 
 
These alternative financing mechanisms themselves have an impact on employment, i.e. 
they destroy a part of the employment effects stemming from the initial labour tax 
reductions.  Indeed, they increase firms' costs and/or selling prices, causing a higher wage 
and a loss of competitiveness.  The degree to which this occurs  depends very much on 
what specific fiscal measure is implemented as an alternative financing mechanism.  
However, in general, the overall employment effect of a shift from labour taxes to other 
revenue sources remains positive. 
 
Empirical research, both at international level and specifically for Belgium, shows positive 
employment effects of labour tax reductions, even if these initial tax reductions are fully 
compensated for by one form or another of indirect taxation
10. This paper also confirms 
these conclusions, making them dependent, however, on the reaction of wages to the 
package of fiscal policy measures. 
 
2.5  The impact on income inequality 
 
Up to now, we have only paid attention to the economic efficiency aspects of labour taxes, 
and the possibility of creating government revenues with these or with alternative taxes. 
However, one should look from a broader perspective at these macroeconomic analyses 
of labour tax reductions, and possible accompanying alternative financing mechanisms. 
 
Taxes and social security contributions do not only function as a means of financing 
government expenditure, and reductions in taxes and contributions do not only impact on 
employment and on the government budget. Taxes and contributions also fulfil an 
important role in redistributing income.  Because labour taxes are proportionally or (more 
often) progressively related to wages, in absolute terms they weigh more on higher 
incomes.  This makes the dispersion of net wages smaller than that of gross wages.  This 
characteristic of direct taxation is not shared by indirect taxes, such as VAT. 
 
                                                                 
10  See e.g.: Bogaert (1996), Bossier e.o. (1987, 1996), De Bruyne e.o. (1998), Goubert e.o. (1995), OECD (2001), 
Valenduc (1996b), Van Poeck e.o. (1998). WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  7 
A shift from direct to indirect taxation may therefore well be neutral for the government 
budget, but is not without consequences for the distribution of incomes and purchasing 
power. Such a shift to more government revenues from indirect taxation, which has a 
smaller redistribution  effect, could thus increase income inequality in society. Recent 
research (especially on Belgium), often based on theoretical simulation models, shows that 
this aspect must indeed be taken into account in fully evaluating such tax shifts
11.  This 
paper, however, does not consider this issue, as an analysis of such welfare effects is 
beyond the scope of the Bank's macroeconomic model. 
 
                                                                 
11   See e.g.: Boadway e.o. (2001), Cantillon e.o. (1999a, 1999b, 2000), Cremer e.o. (1999), Davies e.o. (2000), Decoster 
e.o. (2000), Gentry (1997), Ooghe e.o. (2000). 8  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
3.  INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WAGE FORMATION IN BELGIUM 
 
Before turning to a description of the model used, it is useful to pay attention to the specific 
Belgian institutional settings that shaped the model. 
 
Wages paid by Belgian companies result from negotiations held successively at three 
levels: national,  sector and  firm level, sector level negotiations in so-called joint 
committees being of overriding importance. These negotiations take place within a 
characteristic institutional framework with an overall guaranteed minimum wage, with 
automatic indexing of employees' gross wages to a so-called 'health index' of consumer 
prices and with a wage norm determined at national level, according to the law of 
July 1996 for the promotion of employment and the preventive safeguarding  of firms' 
competitiveness. 
 
3.1  The wage negotiations in the joint committees 
 
In Belgian companies, gross wages are mainly determined through agreements concluded 
in joint committees
12 organised per sector of economic activity (whereby the notion of 
economic sector is sometimes very narrowly defined, the number of joint committees 
exceeding 100).  The outcome of these sector negotiations cannot undershoot the legally 
determined guaranteed minimum wage
13.  However, it may be complemented with 
agreements concluded at the level of the firms, which are bound by the sector agreements. 
 
Although firm level agreements have gained considerably in importance over the last few 
years, Belgium is traditionally regarded as a country where wages are predominantly 
determined at the intermediate (sector) level, as opposed to countries with more 
centralised or decentralised wage formation. 
 
Two institutional characteristics, putting into perspective this cataloguing of Belgium as a 
country where intermediate level wage bargaining predominates, have an important impact 
on the movement in labour costs in Belgian enterprises, namely the indexing mechanism 
and the wage norm. 
 
                                                                 
12  They are called joint committees ('comités paritaires'), because employers and employees have equal representation in 
them. 
13   The minimum wage scale in almost every joint committee exceeds the legally guaranteed minimum. WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  9 
3.2  The indexing mechanism 
 
The indexing mechanism implies that nominal gross wages of Belgian employees are 
automatically indexed according to the movement in the health index (HI) of consumer 
prices, i.e. the national index of consumer prices (NICP) with the exclusion of alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco and motor fuels.  The way this automatic price indexing of wages is 
implemented is agreed by the joint committees.  In some committees, wages are indexed 
at fixed points in time (e.g. every two, three or four months), in others wages are indexed 
each time the HI exceeds a certain threshold (often the threshold value is defined as the 
previous value plus two percent).  Whatever the method applied, each indexing system 
incorporates lags between the movement in the HI and the adaptation of nominal wages. 
This results in wage indexing lagging on average one quarter behind the HI. 
 
As a consequence of this institutional setting, inflation according to NICP, HI and wage 
indexing can sometimes follow quite different time paths.  Moreover, the automatic price 
indexing mechanism of wages interacts with that other important institutional characteristic 
of Belgian wage formation: the wage norm. 
 
3.3  The wage norm 
 
The wage norm constitutes an overall maximum margin for the growth of nominal hourly 
labour costs in Belgian enterprises.  According to the law of July 1996 for the promotion of 
employment and the safeguarding of firms' competitiveness, the social partners
14 should fix 
such a norm every two years (in principle before October 31 of each even-numbered year, 
e.g. in the autumn of 2002) for a two-year period, taking into account a report written by 
the Central Economic Council (CEC)
15 (which, in principle, is published no later than 
September 30). 
 
In this report, the CEC estimates the maximum room for a rise in firms' hourly labour costs 
as a weighted average of the expected nominal increase in labour costs in Belgium's three 
main neighbouring countries (Germany, France and the Netherlands) over the coming two 
years (e.g. 2003-2004). These expectations are based on projections, published by the 
OECD in its Economic Outlook, f or the growth of compensation per employee in the 
business sector.  These projections are corrected for possible changes in the working time 
                                                                 
14  Failing an agreement between the social partners, the government can fix a wage norm that contains at least the 
automatic indexing and scale adjustments. 
15  This is the 'Conseil central de l'économie (CCE)' in which the social partners are also represented. 10  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
per employee, which may be seen from the results of the Labour Force Survey published 
by Eurostat or  extrapolated from it. 
 
This margin, estimated by the CEC on the basis of the expected labour cost growth in the 
neighbouring countries, can be decreased
16 by differences in labour costs that stem from 
higher growth of labour costs in Belgium compared to these reference states over the past 
two years (e.g. 2001-2002), as far as such a derailment is assessed by the CEC. 
 
Estimations of expected automatic indexing of nominal wages, based on inflation 
projections, and estimations of labour cost growth through scale adjustments
17, are 
subtracted from the nominal wage norm, thus determining the room for real wage 
increases. The indexing mechanism thus plays a crucial role in the functioning of the wage 
norm: projected indexing codetermines the ex ante margin for real wage increases, and 
actual indexing explains partly whether or not the wage norm is respected ex post. Real 
wage increases are negotiated in the joint committees (at the beginning of odd-numbered 
years, e.g. 2003, and with an agreement concluded in principle before March 31), possibly 
followed by firm level agreements (in principle concluded no later than May 31). 
 
The specific institutional characteristics of wage formation in Belgian enterprises explained 
above are reflected in the design of the labour market section of the Belgian block of the 
Eurosystem's multi-country econometric model, which is explained in the following section. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
16   The margin for labour cost growth must, however, encompass at least the automatic indexing and scale adjustments. 
17   Resulting from seniority, age, normal promotions or individual changes of category. WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  11 
4.  THE BELGIAN BLOCK OF THE EUROSYSTEM'S MULTICOUNTRY MODEL 
 
The (quarterly) econometric model we use for the simulations in this paper has been 
developed as part of a larger project within the European System of Central Banks.  
Different but comparable national models, augmented with an interest rate reaction 
function and an exchange rate equation, can then be linked to an aggregate multi-country 
model.  Full details concerning the Belgian model can be found in working paper N°4 from 
this series
18. 
 
The relatively compact model is essentially Neo-Keynesian in its approach. The 
equilibrium in the real economy is determined by the supply side, but the short run is  
determined by demand. Nominal rigidities (sluggish adjustment of prices) slow down the 
adjustment process.  One of the key features of the model is its ability to distinguish 
between 'intrinsic' adjustments (related to delayed  responses through costly adjustment 
processes) and 'expectation' dynamics (related to agents trying to anticipate and 
incorporate future information into their actual decision making).  Forward-looking 
behaviour is therefore fairly widespread in the model: consumption, investment, labour 
demand and the pricing decision can all be (at least partly) determined in a forward-looking 
way. The model distinguishes the economy's main sectors such as households, firms, 
government and external transactions, but does  not break them down further into 
sub-sectors such as industry and services.  Moreover, it can be shown that in the long run 
the model converges to its steady state, defined by the underlying economic theory. 
 
The model contains two alternative subroutines for wage formation.  In the most general 
one, wages are determined endogenously as the result of a bargaining process between 
unions and firms.  Following a 'right to manage' model, unions and firms bargain over the 
wage level, taking into account the labour demand curve.  Only thereafter do firms set 
goods prices and employment.  In this context, wage setting ultimately depends on the tax 
wedge, the relative output price in terms of the consumption price level, the unemployment 
rate and trend labour productivity.  Or, more formally, the equilibrium nominal wage cost  
 
                                                                 
18   See Jeanfils (2000). 12  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
per hour can be estimated as 
 
    ln(W) =     0.258 ln(1+TW1) - 0.258 ln(1-TW2-TW3)  
         - 0.0045 u + 0.258 ln(PY) + (1-0.258) ln(PC) 
        + 0.003828 Trend - 7.546 
 
with     W    nominal labour cost per hour 
      TW1  tax wedge: implicit rate of employers' social security contributions 
      TW2  tax wedge: implicit rate of employees' social security contributions 
      TW3  tax wedge: implicit rate of direct tax on earned labour income 
      u    unemployment rate 
      PY    private value added deflator 
      PC    private consumption deflator 
 
In the short run, the actual wage cost will differ from this long run target, and is embedded 
in an error correction mechanism with the same set of variables augmented with apparent 
productivity changes and with an automatic indexing mechanism through a so-called 
health index. 
 
In an alternative subroutine, used for short and medium term policy analysis (and as such 
in the rest of this paper), the wage norm, as outlined above, has been mimicked.  Two 
sub-alternatives are available and they will both be used throughout this paper. It is 
therefore important to make a clear distinction between those two alternatives from the 
outset. 
 
In the first option, one starts with the observation that, even though a nominal (ceiling for) 
labour cost per hour increase is extracted from our main trade partners' wage negotiation 
outcomes, it is re-expressed in a real increase using a prediction for the wage indexing.  If 
positive or negative price surprises take place once the real increases are fixed, 
employees are completely immunised through the automatic indexing mechanism (if we 
disregard very temporary adjustment lags from actual price surprises to the wage index).  
All simulations that take place under a regime where the trajectory of the real wages is 
fixed exogenously will carry the label ' real rule'.  Ultimately, one likes to see a 
convergence in the pattern of the real wage increases.  The simulated nominal labour  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  13 
cost per hour in such a scenario is calculated as 
 
    W = W R x [ 1/12 PHI + 8/12 PHI (-1) + 3/12 PHI (-2) ] 
 
with:    W    nominal labour cost per hour 
      WR    real labour cost per hour, exogenously given 
      PHI    health index 
 
The term in brackets is the estimated/calibrated model of the average wage indexing in 
Belgium. Two-thirds of the adjustment of wages to new price information happens in the 
next quarter. Due to lots of contracts using a threshold indexing mechanism, such an 
approximation overestimates nominal wages in periods of very low inflation and 
underestimates them in high inflation periods, but it can be shown that such an 
approximation leads to fairly accurate results. 
 
In the second option of the alternative subroutine, one exploits the fact that, ultimately, the 
wage norm has to make a comparison between the pattern of the Belgian nominal wage 
increases and a weighted average of our main trade partners' equivalent.  Under 
converging price movements, this makes no difference in relation to the previous option, 
but things change when, for some reason or other, prices react and adjust differently in 
Belgium than in Germany, France or the Netherlands. Depending on the kind of price 
discrepancy that takes place, employees may be better or worse off in real terms.  In this 
kind of scenario, employees carry the risk of price surprises through a higher or lower than 
expected real wage increase.  All simulations that take place under a regime where the 
trajectory of the nominal wages is fixed exogenously will carry the label 'nominal rule'.  
Ultimately, one likes to see a convergence in the pattern of nominal wage increases.  
Using the same symbols as above, the implied real wage can be extracted from the now 
exogenously given nominal wage trajectory (rather than the real wage trajectory as was 
the case above) by inverting the previous equation: 
 
    WR = W / ( 1/12 PHI  + 8/12 PHI (-1) + 3/12 PHI (-2) ) 
 
Throughout this paper it will become clear that the option one takes can lead to 
appreciable differences in the simulation results, though mainly of course in those 
simulations that integrate fiscal policy reactions to maintain budget neutrality through 14  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
changes in indirect taxation. Those reactions can have a substantial effect on consumption 
prices and, through the automatic indexing, on wages. 
 
As we will focus on how a reduction in social security contributions affects employment, we 
can examine the mechanisms at work, in the context of the model outlined above, in 
greater detail. 
 
Broadly speaking, ESSC reductions affect employment through two channels: a relative 
cost effect and an output or demand effect. As pointed out before, the theoretical 
reasoning has to take place in a world with exogenous nominal interest rates and 
exchange rates as they are decided upon (or endogenously driven) at supra-national level 
only. 
 
In the first place, there is a direct relative cost effect: the same level of output can be 
produced at a lower cost through the reduced cost of the production factor labour.  The 
total cost can be reduced even further through rescheduling the optimal combination of the 
factors labour and capital: as labour has become relatively cheaper, more of it will be used 
in the production process, thereby slowing down the substitution of labour for capital.  This 
re-optimising on the supply side will lead to indirect changes in demand, changing the 
actual level of output.  Domestic demand increases through a rise in disposable income, 
generated by higher employment and higher real labour income, as products should have 
become cheaper.  This latter factor, which is nothing other than an improved competitive 
position, is also the driving force behind the rise in net export demand (under the 
assumption of unchanged labour costs in competing foreign firms).  The total demand 
effect will, of course, lead to a larger output, creating an increase in the firm's demand for 
both labour and capital. 
 
While the second output or demand effect is endogenous to the model, the first direct cost 
or substitution effect depends on the initial impact of the ESSC reductions on labour costs.  
It is all too easy to assume that such reductions have an equivalent impact on the labour 
cost.  However, standard theory on wage bargaining between trade unions and employers' 
organisations shows that part of employers' taxes and contributions is shifted backward to 
employees via the negotiated gross wage.  This also means that ESSC reductions will not 
reduce labour costs by the same amount: trade unions will be able to claim some part of 
the ESSC reductions for higher gross wages.  The extent to which this is the case depends WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  15 
on the relative bargaining power of trade unions in the negotiating process and on the 
labour market situation in general
19. 
 
Normally, these shifting backward effects can be estimated in an econometric wage 
equation. However, the particular characteristics of wage formation in Belgium make things 
trickier. The nominal hourly labour cost increase in the business sector, resulting from the 
negotiated pay increases, should not exceed the weighted average of projected business 
sector labour cost increases in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Often, both 
employers and employees know in advance the magnitude of (new) ESSC reductions the 
government is going to grant.    Since, finally, the total labour cost i s compared to the 
equivalent concept of our main trade partners (that is: a concept in which ESSC reductions 
are actually taken into account), expected/anticipated future reductions will affect the 
ceiling on gross wage increases that is implied by the norm for total labour cost rises
20. 
 
It is therefore possible that these ESSC reductions are not only used to lower the 
(employers') labour cost, but are used by the negotiating social partners as a subsidy to go 
part of the way to meet employees' wage claims.  It is actually the existence of a wage 
norm expressed in terms of 'labour cost per hour' that could exacerbate this effect: under 
the quoted restrictions, a budgeted social security contribution reduction implies an 
increased margin for gross wage increases, and as such it will be used during the process 
of breaking down the nominal allowed (one could say 'predetermined') hourly wage 
increase into a real collective increase and an expected price indexing component.  In the 
extreme case, such a scenario would imply an unchanged labour cost for the employers: 
the social security contribution reductions will be exactly offset by employees' gross wage 
increases.  As the employers will observe an unchanged labour cost, it is to be expected 
that there will be almost no direct reaction in their demand for labour. 
 
In a real limiting case, such a clause could encourage both employers and employees to 
expect that if their talks should come to a dead end, negotiations can always be saved by 
new social security contribution reductions.  Such a scenario would shift the responsibility 
of respecting the wage norm from social partners to government.   
                                                                 
19  For example, in the case of relatively strong trade unions and a tight labour market, a bigger part of the ESSC reductions 
will feed into higher gross wages, leading to a smaller reduction in labour costs, compared to the case of relatively weak 
unions and a labour market characterised by high unemployment. 
20  Hourly wage increases by our main trade partners only constitute a ceiling during the bargaining process, and should not 
necessarily be seen as an inevitable outcome. 16  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
In most cases, where ESSC reductions go hand in hand with a negotiated labour cost that 
lies on or close to the wage norm frontier (implicitly hiding gross wage increases), their 
'contribution' will come closer to a government subsidy to the employed than to a 
government employment subsidy. 
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5.  SCENARIOS AND ALTERNATIVES 
 
From the previous section it becomes clear that there might be a large variety of simulation 
outcomes after an ESSC reduction shock, depending on the magnitude of the shifting 
backwards effect. For the sake of the simplicity and clarity of the exposition, we consider 
two limiting possibilities for the design of our simulations: scenarios in which all reductions 
are effectively used for labour cost reductions (scenario a), and scenarios in which all 
reductions are entirely offset by increased gross wages (scenario b). The former is neutral 
for the employee at the gross wage per hour level, the latter is neutral for the employer at 
the level of the labour cost per hour. Both scenarios will determine the span of possible 
simulation outcomes.  But given a wage norm for labour costs per hour, outcomes closer 
to scenario b are perhaps the more realistic. 
 
In both limiting scenarios, part of the initial fiscal cost of the reduction of ESSC will be 
recovered by the government (endogenously) through fiscal feedback effects. On the one 
hand, higher employment and/or higher wages, resulting from the policy measure, broaden 
the labour tax base, which leads to higher fiscal and para-fiscal receipts. Lower 
unemployment, on the other hand, leads to lower expenditure for unemployment benefits. 
However, these feedback effects will never fully compensate for the initial fiscal cost. 
Therefore, if the government wants to maintain the same status regarding 'fiscal solvency' 
as before the shock, and in the long run there is no real alternative, it has to find 
alternatives to finance the ESSC reductions. 
 
For each of the limiting scenarios, we will therefore analyse three sub-cases at the level of 
the fiscal compensation.  In the first one, the shock is applied without any new government 
measures (no fiscal compensation).  As noted before, one should be careful interpreting 
the resulting shock outcomes, as, at least during the period on which we focus, one does 
not return to an equilibrium growth path
21.  In sub-case two and three we will consider two 
financing alternatives that keep the government budget balance in place almost 
immediately: an increase in the rate of value added tax (VAT) and the introduction of a tax  
 
                                                                 
21  However, a fiscal solvency rule has been switched on after a period of 10 years, bringing the deficit and debt to GDP 
ratio gradually back to baseline levels through an adjustment of government transfers to households.  The resulting 
effects of this adjustment process on household income will, via a discount factor, impact on the actual permanent 
income now through the forward looking nature of the model used.  However, some feedback effects, such as an 
increase in the long rates due to a higher debt ratio, are not present in the model. 18  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
on production (PT).  We see the latter as a (very rough) proxy for some types of 
environmental taxes.  Some of these taxes, e.g. a CO2 tax on firms, are directly linked to 
firms' production and production costs. In this we have to make the strong assumption that 
firms are not able to change their production method in order to produce in a 'cleaner' way 
and pay less taxes.  One could see such a production tax as having full financing capacity, 
because firms can only avoid it by producing less and not by producing differently, and 
having almost no beneficial environmental impact.  In reality, green taxes should have less 
financing capacity and more environmental impact than in our set-up.  Other financing 
alternatives, though conceivable, are not considered. 
 
Both the fiscal compensation measures and alternative financing measures have an 
impact on employment.  The VAT measure increases consumer prices and hence nominal 
wages, with a negative impact on employment. The tax base of the PT measure is broader 
than that of the VAT measure. It increases firms' production costs and thereby reduces 
production in itself, and hence labour demand. 
 
There is quite a difference in the way VAT rate shocks or the introduction of a PT impact 
on the economy. A VAT rate increase directly impacts on the price level of private 
consumption. This will not only lead to a reduction in demand, but will also generate a 
price-wage spiral through the automatic wage indexing regime. This latter effect makes 
labour less attractive as compared to capital (short term interest rates are held fixed in the 
model).  Both factors, i.e. the decrease in output demand and the increase in relative 
labour costs, will impact negatively on labour demand by firms. On top of that come 
second-round competitiveness effects through the price-wage spiral that makes output 
more expensive for export purposes as well, leading to a further final demand reduction.  
As opposed to a VAT rate increase that impacts on private consumption only, the negative 
effects of the adoption of a PT are spread over all final demand items alike (private and 
government consumption, export and investment), and consequently, all sectors will be hit 
(and not mainly households as in the previous case).  A considerable share of the increase 
in the output price will therefore be exported (at the expense of decreased 
competitiveness), the government budget will worsen through an increase in nominal 
government consumption, firms’ profits will decrease as a result of lower demand and 
lower profit margins, and households will be hit through higher consumption prices and 
through the reduced labour demand by firms. 
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As outlined above (these fiscal compensation measures have an impact on the price 
level), it is important whether one specifies the ceiling on the labour cost per hour increase, 
determined by the wage norm, in real terms or in nominal terms.  This means that, for all of 
the three sub-cases in both limiting scenarios, we have to come up with results under a 
real rule and a nominal rule.  One could look at these rules in another way as well.  In a 
limiting case where ESSC reductions can fully impact on the labour cost, 'nothing' should 
change from the point of view of an employee.  But (given the effect of these reductions, 
and possibly fiscal measures, on prices) this 'nothing' still has to be defined in either real or 
nominal terms.  Thus, depending on the scenario, a real rule means that either the real 
gross wage per hour (reductions entirely used for labour cost reduction) or the real labour 
cost per hour (reductions entirely used for gross wage increases) is fixed between baseline 
and shock.  A nominal rule keeps the nominal gross wage per hour or the nominal labour 
cost per hour fixed throughout the simulation. 
 
Two limiting cases, three subclasses and two rules determine a grid of 12 simulation 
outcomes. Throughout the remainder of this paper, references will be made to the different 
scenarios as they are organised in table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 - Comprehensive overview of ESSC reduction simulation scenarios 
 
a.  ESSC reduction entirely used for labour cost reduction 
 
I. Real rule: 
real gross wage unchanged 
II. Nominal rule: 
nominal gross wage unchanged 
1.  No fiscal compensation  scenario a.1.I  scenario a.1.II 
2.  Increase in VAT rate  scenario a.2.I  scenario a.2.II 
3.  Introduction of PT rate  scenario a.3.I  scenario a.3.II 
 
 
b.  ESSC reduction entirely offset by gross wage increase 
 
I. Real rule: 
real labour cost unchanged 
II. Nominal rule: 
nominal labour cost unchanged 
1.  No fiscal compensation  scenario b.1.I  scenario b.1.II 
2.  Increase in VAT rate  scenario b.2.I  scenario b.2.II 
3.  Introduction of PT rate  scenario b.3.I  scenario b.3.II 
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6.  SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
The overview of the results of the simulations below follows the structure of the 
presentation of the scenarios in the previous chapter. 
 
This section presents the results of the series of simulations of ESSC reductions.  In each 
of these shocks the level of the implicit rate of ESSC (on gross wages) is permanently 
decreased by 5 p.c.  Using the actual implicit rate, this corresponds to a decrease of some 
1.3 percentage points.  We first analyse the possible effects of such reductions in cases 
where they impact fully on labour costs (subsection 6.1), and after that we treat the case 
where these reductions lead to an equivalent rise in gross wages (subsection 6.2).  As 
already stated, alternative financing options are considered in each of these sub-cases. 
 
6.1  Scenarios with labour cost reduction 
 
In the first set of simulations, we assume that co-ordination between government and 
social partners, in order to stimulate employment by fiscal measures, guarantees that the 
ESSC reductions lead to an equivalent reduction in firms' labour costs. Tables 2 to 5 
illustrate the effects over time on employment (expressed in number of jobs) and on the 
government deficit, with the wage setters adopting either a real rule or a nominal rule. 
 
 
Table 2 - Employment effects for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a real rule, for 
an ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages of number of jobs, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario a.1.I 
labour cost reduction 
no fiscal compensation 
 
+2100 
 
+6200 
 
+10400 
 
+13800 
 
+16600 
   
+23500 
Scenario a.2.I 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
+600 
 
+1700 
 
+2300 
 
+2800 
 
+3300 
   
+4400 
Scenario a.3.I 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced 
 
+1000 
 
+3200 
 
+5400 
 
+7400 
 
+9000 
   
+12800 
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Table 3 - Employment effects for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a nominal rule
22 
for an ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages of number of jobs, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario a.1.II 
labour cost reduction 
no fiscal compensation 
 
+1700 
 
+4900 
 
+7700 
 
+9600 
 
+11200 
   
+15400 
Scenario a.2.II 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
+1200 
 
+3800 
 
+5800 
 
+7300 
 
+8500 
   
+11400 
Scenario a.3.II 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced  
 
+1000 
 
+3100 
 
+4800 
 
+6000 
 
+7000 
   
+9600 
 
 
In scenarios a.1.I and a.1.II, no fiscal measure to obtain budget neutrality is imposed.  
In these cases, employment creation is shown to be quite substantial. The labour cost 
reduction puts downward pressure on prices. Combining an exogenous path for a nominal 
labour cost per hour (given by the expected wage movements among our main trade 
partners) with an automatic indexing mechanism based on those lower prices, leads 
implicitly to real gross wage increases.  As the firm ultimately considers real wages in its 
factor demand, it should be no surprise that the scenario under a real rule will show 
somewhat better results for employment.  According to tables 2 and 3, private employment 
(in number of persons) would gradually increase to reach some 17,000 or 11,000 
additional jobs after 5 years, under a real rule and a nominal rule respectively. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show, in their first sub-case, that fiscal feedback effects increase over time 
but never fully compensate for the initial fiscal cost of the ESSC reduction.  Under both 
rules, and after 5 years, the government budget shows an additional deficit in the order of 
magnitude of 500 to 600 million euro after 5  years (as compared to an initial cost of 
1,000 million euro.  As pointed out earlier, the alternative financing mechanisms necessary 
to keep this operation (largely) budget neutral can take the form of higher VAT receipts 
(through an increase in the VAT rate) or the introduction of a production tax.  We have 
introduced j ust  one shock to the level of the taxation rate.  Its magnitude has been 
calibrated so as to offset the cost of the ESSC reduction, at least over the first years. 
                                                                 
22   Remember that, under a nominal rule, employers try to pass on all shock-induced price effects to the employees, thereby 
effectively changing their real gross wage.  This can be positive for the employees in a deflationary environment (pure 
ESSC reduction, no fiscal compensation), or negative in an inflationary environment (fiscal compensation of ESSC 
reduction). 22  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
Table 4 - Budget balance for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a real rule f or an 
ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages in millions of euros, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario a.1.I 
labour cost reduction 
no fiscal compensation 
 
-1000 
 
-900 
 
-900 
 
-700 
 
-600 
   
-500 
Scenario a.2.I 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
-100 
 
0 
 
+0 
 
+0 
 
+0 
   
+0 
Scenario a.3.I 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced  
 
-100 
 
-100 
 
-100 
 
0 
 
+100 
   
+400 
 
 
Table 5 - Budget balance for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a nominal rule,
  for an ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages in millions of euros, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario a.1.II 
labour cost reduction 
no fiscal compensation 
 
-1000 
 
-800 
 
-700 
 
-600 
 
-500 
   
-500 
Scenario a.2.II 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
-200 
 
-200 
 
-100 
 
+0 
 
+0 
   
+100 
Scenario a.3.II 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced  
 
-200 
 
-100 
 
+0 
 
+100 
 
+200 
   
+400 
 
 
In the second sub-case, the negative fiscal effects of the ESSC reduction are 
compensated for by an increase in the VAT rate.  The MCM model works with an implicit 
VAT rate (share of VAT revenue in private consumption less VAT revenue). The calibrated 
shock applied increases this VAT rate by some 6.5 p.c., bringing its level almost a full 
percentage point higher.  VAT increases places the whole cost of this measure on the 
sector of households: price rises will decrease their real disposable income and thus their 
savings ratio.  The latter will only be able to return to its former level by some combination 
of a higher disposable income (obtained through automatic wage indexing) and a reduction 
in real consumption. This decrease in demand leads, of course, directly to less 
employment. Through the strong feedback effects of increased prices on nominal gross 
wages, the input factor labour will become more costly for the employer. The change in 
this relative cost structure will result in a substitution of capital for labour. The government, 
on the other hand, gains not only directly through higher VAT receipts, but also through the WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003  23 
higher inflation
23.  When gross wages are allowed to rise nominally (i.e. under a real rule), 
the tax base increases, leading to higher social contributions and direct taxes.  These can 
then offset decreases in revenues resulting from less employment and higher 
unemployment expenditure. 
 
The price effects of the VAT rate increase (with heavy inflationary effects on private 
consumption prices, though not on export prices), more than outweigh the deflationary 
effects from the initial ESSC reduction, creating a net inflationary environment.  A nominal 
ceiling will thus decrease real wages and be more favourable for job creation.  Under a 
quasi unchanged government budget balance, and when real gross wages have to remain 
at their baseline level (i.e. under a real rule), a gradual increase in employment of up to 
about 3,000 extra people after 5 years can be observed, as compared to some 8,000 extra 
jobs under a nominal rule regime (see tables 2 and 3). 
 
Alternatively, the negative fiscal effects of the ESSC reduction can also be compensated 
for by the introduction of a production tax on the nominal value added.  This tax can be 
seen as an indirect tax at the firm level: it increases the normal output according to the 
products' value added content.  As the firms in the MCM model are, to a significant extent, 
price-setters
24, they will try to increase their output price after the introduction of a PT-tax 
to restore some of the negative effects on their profit margin.  These negative effects will 
thus be passed on to their customers: the latter belong to three groups: (1) households 
and government through their consumption, (2) the rest of the world through exports and 
(3) other firms and government through investment demand.  We start from the 
assumption that firms will try to increase their prices in the same way as they have been 
taxed: in accordance with the value added content of the product (and not just an equal 
percentage increase for each and every product alike).  As this content, on average, is a 
lot higher for goods destined for domestic private consumption than it is for export goods, 
the price of the former will suffer more.  As it so happens, the same holds true in largely 
comparable proportions for the energy content of the average consumption and export 
goods.  The results obtained are thus useful in an 'energy tax' approach, where producers 
would pass on production tax generated price increases proportionally to the energy 
content in the final goods. 
                                                                 
23  All government revenues are endogenously determined in the model.  Most government expenses are exogenously 
determined in real terms, with the notable exception of unemployment benefits (that do, of course, vary with the number 
of unemployed) and interest payments.  The deflator for government expenses is endogenously determined and is a 
function of underlying prices, depending on the category of expenses (consumption, investment, transfers). 
24   The MCM model has estimated that, on average, Belgian firms are for 70 p.c. price-setters, and for the remaining 30 p.c. 
they are constrained by the prices of their competitors. 24  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
It is important to notice that price increases are now shared between prices for private 
consumption goods and prices for goods that will be exported. Given the high level of 
Belgian exports, a significant share of the shock-induced price rise will be exported, albeit 
at the expense of a loss in competitiveness (itself resulting from the improvement of the 
terms of trade).  But these exported price increases will not have any feedback effects on 
domestic prices or, ultimately, on wages through the automatic indexing mechanism, as is 
the case for price rises on the domestic market (and for the full 100 p.c. in the VAT rate 
increase scenario). 
 
If the price increases occurred mainly in products that are excluded from the health index 
basket (as might, under certain circumstances, be expected if an 'energy tax' were 
introduced), price-wage increases could further be kept under control. But the same holds 
true if the indirect tax increase were targeted through a rise in the VAT rate on energy 
products only (or an increase in the excise rate due on alcohol and tobacco).  Wage 
increases would then be correspondingly lower.  This would in turn lead to a lower real 
disposable income and further slow down demand. 
 
As was the case for the VAT rate increase, an equivalent, but unique, production tax rate 
has been calibrated so that it largely compensates for the cost of the ESSC reduction, at 
least over the first years
25.  A production tax of about 0.45 p.c. on nominal value added 
from private sector firms is shown to be able to offset the costs related to a 5 p.c. reduction 
in the implicit level of the ESSC rate  (reducing the level of the ESSC rate by some 
1.3 percentage points). 
 
As already mentioned in the scenarios used, the inflationary effects after the introduction of 
a production tax are more muted, largely because price increases can be recouped by 
firms on a larger base than private consumption alone, and, most notably, because part of 
the inflationary effects can be exported. Therefore, and unlike the previous case, the 
deflationary effects of the ESSC reduction outweigh the effects of the higher consumption 
deflator.  More jobs are therefore created under a real rule than under a nominal one.  And 
also, under a real rule, the effects on employment of the introduction of a production tax 
are slightly more positive than the ones obtained under a VAT rate increase. 
 
                                                                 
25  It is not the neutrality as such that is really important, rather the fact that the remaining impact on the government budget 
is comparable to that in the previous case, so as not to bias the employment effects through an implicit higher or lower 
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The results for the three scenarios above are summarised in graph 1.  It is clear that the 
greatest impact on employment is seen in scenarios a.1.I and a.1.II, where budget 
neutrality is not imposed and there is no fiscal compensation.  Alternative financing of 
government expenditure would partly destroy some of the positive employment impact of 
the initial ESSC reduction measure. 
 
In this, fiscal compensation with a production tax is slightly more effective in terms of job 
creation than an increase in value added tax, because a part of the inflationary effects can 
be exported.  The negative price elasticity of output leads to less demand and fewer jobs, 
but there is no supplementary negative effect through the price-wage spiral. 
 
When comparing results within a fiscal compensation scenario but switching between a 
real rule and a nominal rule, one can see that, if a net inflationary effect results from the 
shock (as in the VAT scenarios a.2._), a nominal rule leads to larger employment effects 
than a real rule keeping the real gross wages unchanged.  In the latter case, employees 
are immunised against these price effects and thus see their nominal gross wage rise as 
the consumer index rises.  The opposite is true if net deflationary effects arise from the 
shock (as in the scenarios a.1._ and a.3._). 
 
 
Graph 1 -  Employment growth and deficit ratio for three fiscal compensation scenarios, in 
the case of an effective labour cost reduction (ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c.) 
 
(percentage points, compared to baseline) 
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6.2  Scenarios with gross wage increase 
 
In the next set of scenarios (b.1.I, b.1.II, b.2.I, b.2.II, b.3.I and b.3.II), we assume that there 
is not enough co-ordination between government and social partners to guarantee that the 
ESSC reductions lead to an equivalent reduction in firms' labour costs. Instead, the social 
partners agree to use the reductions to finance higher gross wages. We assume the 
extreme case where this gross wage increase amounts to the full ESSC reduction and 
labour costs are unaffected. Tables 6 to 9 illustrate the different effects on private 
employment and on the government deficit for this case. 
 
Due to the positive net inflation effects (either direct effects from the increased i ndirect 
taxation or second-round price effects resulting from higher real disposable income), 
simulations under a real rule (tables 6 and 8) actually never respect the wage norm (that 
tries to put a ceiling on increases in nominal labour cost per hour), always leaving 
employers with higher nominal labour costs than before the shocks.  Unsurprisingly, these 
will produce a worse employment creation outcome than the results in tables 7 and 9, 
where we are working on the wage norm frontier (nominal rule). 
 
 
Table 6 - Employment for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a real rule, for an ESSC 
tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages of number of jobs, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario b.1.I 
gross wage increase 
no fiscal compensation 
 
+600 
 
+1400 
 
+1700 
 
+2000 
 
+2200 
   
+3300 
Scenario b.2.I 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
-300 
 
-1400 
 
-3300 
 
-4900 
 
-6100 
   
-8600 
Scenario b.3.I 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced 
 
0 
 
-300 
 
-1100 
 
-1600 
 
-2000 
   
-2600 
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Table 7 - Employment for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a nominal rule, for an 
ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages of number of jobs, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario b.1.II 
gross wage increase 
no fiscal compensation 
 
+700 
 
+1700 
 
+2500 
 
+3000 
 
+3600 
   
+5300 
Scenario b.2.II 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
+400 
 
+900 
 
+1000 
 
+1300 
 
+1600 
   
+2300 
Scenario b.3.II 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced 
 
+300 
 
+700 
 
+800 
 
+1000 
 
+1200 
   
+2100 
 
 
In scenarios b.1.I and b.1.II, no fiscal measure to obtain budget neutrality is imposed.  
Even in this case, employment creation is shown to be rather poor.  According to tables 6 
and 7, private employment (in number of persons) would increase by only 2,000 to 
4,000 jobs over the course of five years under a real and nominal rule respectively.  There 
is little to no relative labour cost effect on employment.  Employment only grows through 
an increase in domestic demand, stemming from the gross wage increase.  The ESSC 
reductions can thus largely be seen as a transfer from the government to the working 
population.  Almost no extra employment is generated, at great cost. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show that, even if the feedback effects are a lot larger than in the previous 
simulations (mainly through increased revenues from direct taxes and employees' social 
security contributions on the increased gross wages), they far from compensate for the 
initial fiscal cost of the ESSC reduction.  After taking second-round effects into account, a 
negative effect of about 400 to 500 million euro will remain after 5 years, or half the impact 
of the initial cost.  If the level of social expenditure previously financed by the ESSC is to 
be maintained, alternative financing mechanisms are again necessary. Due to the larger 
feedback effects on the government budget, this alternative financing will be less 
substantial than in the previous scenarios. 
 
Given that there are almost no employment effects even when no budget neutrality is 
imposed, it is clear that the outcome  could rapidly turn into job destruction if fiscal 
compensation measures are imposed, especially if, due to increased inflation, they  push 
the nominal labour cost per hour beyond the wage norm frontier, as will be the case under 
a real rule.  Table 6 shows that this is indeed the case, as the total would gradually build 
up to some 6,000 or 2,000 job losses after 5  years, depending on whether  the 28  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
compensation took place through a VAT rate increase or the introduction of a production 
tax. 
 
Under a nominal rule, the nominal hourly labour cost constitutes a ceiling.  Initially, the 
nominal labour cost per hour declines as a consequence of the ESSC reduction; in the 
next stage, gross wage claims (taking into account the creation of additional inflationary 
effects) can only be expressed in so far as they push the nominal gross labour cost per 
hour back to its original level.  Real wage increases will be smaller the higher the extra 
inflation, and by now we know that more inflation is created through the VAT scenario than 
through its PT counterpart.  For this reason, the former scenario is expected to show a 
somewhat better employment outcome. 
 
In the PT scenario, domestic demand will be higher than when compared to a VAT 
scenario, because real disposable income is better safeguarded.  But as firms try to gain 
back a part of the imposed PT by increasing their export prices, they will see their export 
demand decrease through a worsened competitive position,  leading to a decrease in 
export demand.  This, together with the higher real labour costs (when compared to a VAT 
scenario), will actually lead to destruction of employment, as can be seen from table 7. 
 
 
Table 8 - Budget balance for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a real rule, for an 
ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages in millions of euros, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario b.1.I 
gross wage increase 
no fiscal compensation 
 
-500 
 
-400 
 
-400 
 
-400 
 
-400 
   
-600 
Scenario b.2.I 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
+100 
 
+200 
 
+100 
 
+100 
 
0 
   
-200 
Scenario b.3.I 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
   
0 
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Table 9 - Budget balance for three fiscal compensation scenarios, under a nominal rule, for 
an ESSC tax rate cut of 5 p.c. 
 
(yearly averages in millions of euros, compared to baseline) 
 
  T0  T1  T2  T3  T4    T9 
Scenario b.1.II 
gross wage increase 
no fiscal compensation 
 
-500 
 
-500 
 
-500 
 
-500 
 
-500 
   
-500 
Scenario b.2.II 
labour cost reduction 
increased VAT rate 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
-100 
   
-100 
Scenario b.3.II 
labour cost reduction 
PT rate introduced  
 
-100 
 
-100 
 
-100 
 
0 
 
0 
   
0 
 
 
The results for the above scenarios are now summarised in graph 2.  It is clear that the 
greatest, but still rather small, employment impact is seen in scenarios b.1.I and b.1.II, 
where budget neutrality is not imposed and there is no fiscal compensation. Of course, this 
scenario would again call for alternative mechanisms for financing social expenditure.  In 
this case, they would almost always completely destroy the positive employment impact of 
the initial ESSC reduction measure.  A real rule is more harmful for employment than a 
nominal rule, because the former accepts that the nominal labour cost increases beyond 
the level fixed as wage norm.  Under a real rule, budget-neutral tax shifts now destroy 
employment. 
 
Under a nominal rule, compensation through a VAT rate increase has a slightly positive 
effect on employment, whereas a PT destroys employment.  The latter produces stronger 
negative demand effects from export markets as a PT-induced price increase is passed on 
in export prices, in combination with higher real labour costs.  In general, we can say that if 
ESSC reductions are allowed to be entirely used to finance higher gross wages and if they 
are fiscally neutralised in one way or another, they do not lead to employment creation, but 
in many cases actually destroy jobs. 
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Graph 2 -  Employment growth and deficit ratio for three fiscal compensation scenarios, in 
the case of no effective labour cost reduction, but gross wage increase (ESSC tax 
rate cut of 5 p.c.) 
 
(percentage points, compared to baseline) 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
 
The wage formation process and the need for budget-neutral fiscal policy measures play 
an important role in the evaluation of the impact on employment that can be expected from 
labour tax reductions.  This paper uses a macroeconomic model that captures two 
important institutional characteristics of wage formation in Belgium, i.e. the automatic 
indexing mechanism and the wage norm, to analyse the possible employment effects of a 
budget-neutral reduction in employers' social security contributions. 
 
With respect to employers' social security contributions (ESSC), the conclusions of our 
analysis can be summarised as follows.  The employment impact of ESSC reductions is 
not clear-cut.  We showed that this impact depends on the outcome of the wage formation 
process. The institution of the wage norm in Belgium also plays a role here.    The job 
creation generated by ESSC reductions can only be significant if the reductions lead to an 
equivalent decrease in labour costs and an equivalent decrease in the relative growth of 
labour costs compared to our competitors.  If the ESSC reductions are completely offset by 
an equivalent rise in employees' gross wages, which is not entirely unrealistic given a 
wage norm for labour costs, job creation is very limited because there is no favourable 
relative cost effect in that case. 
 
In any case, the ESSC reductions are only partly self-financing, and the cost per  job 
created remains relatively high. So, if the initial level of government expenditure is to be 
maintained, alternative financing mechanisms are needed.  Indeed, a worsening of the 
government budget is not sustainable.  Indirect taxation, in the form of value added tax or 
a tax on production (e.g. some environmental taxes) can, among other measures not 
considered in the paper, achieve budget neutrality.  Since these indirect taxes are 
inflationary, the way they impact on wages and labour costs is also crucial.  Although fiscal 
measures of this kind are in themselves detrimental for job creation, the net employment 
effect of budget-neutral combinations of tax shifts can still be positive under certain 
conditions.  In general, the alternative financing mechanisms will destroy less of the initial 
positive employment impact of the ESSC reductions the less their inflationary effects are 
passed on to wages.  In a full indexing regime, it may be difficult to prevent these effects 
from being passed on. 
 
The policy conclusion of this analysis is that budget- neutral ESSC reductions can only be 
an instrument to stimulate job creation in as much as they effectively reduce labour costs, 32  WORKING PAPER N°36 - MARCH 2003 
preferably also compared to our competitors. In the best situation, these reductions create 
as large a gap as possible between the labour cost and the exogenously given wage norm.  
That is not easy to achieve within the framework of wage formation in Belgium, without a 
special co-ordination effort between all labour market players. 
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